The Preconditions for Producer Power: Comments by Page, William
The Preconditions for Producer Power: Comments*
William Page
Hanns Maull concludes by summarising some
of the factors he feels to be relevant to the success
of OPEC, and he queries the ability of other
commodity producers to follow that lead. "The
special ingredients of OPEC power (were)
the high degree of importer dependence, the high
cost of stock-piling and limited possibilities of
substitution and recycling, the producers' power
over cheaply exploitable reserves, their substantial
foreign exchange reserves and low dependence
upon imports. .
Perhaps another means of summarising this argu-
ment is to say that three factors are relevant to
the success of OPEC and OPEC-type action:
1. The existence of oligopolistic power in the
market. In this context, this means the extent to
which a cutback in supplies will lead to an in-
crease in total revenues, with a distinction made
between the short-term and the long-term. Elas-
ticity of demand is relevant, remembering that
long-term demand for the final material is not
necessarily equivalent to long-term demand for
the specific raw materials (as secondary, recycled
material or new types of ore may be used to
some extent in their place). More traditional
substitution, such as aluminium for copper, can
also play a role. Elasticity of supply from the
rest of the world is a second component and,
table 1: Some Figures Relating to Minerals Production and Trade
while of less signficance in the long run, the initial
level of stocks will play a role.
Countervailing power of the consumers. Maull's
point relating to the OPEC countries' import
dependence upon the consumers is interesting.
Dependence can hinge around not simply com-
modity imports by the producers, but loans,
technical assistance and the like. To set off down
a path where consumers are likely to retaliate on
a large scale is clearly dangerous.
The political viability and unity of the pro-
ducers' organisation, a point perhaps worth more
stress than Maull gives it. Regardless of the
theoretical merits of producer action of one kind
or another, little is going to be achieved if they
cannot unite on agreed objectives and actions.
For instance, the export cut-backs agreed in late
1974 by the members of CIPECthe copper
organisationwere heralded in many places as
quite an achievement, and doubt has been ex-
pressed in some quarters as to whether they are
in fact being fully implemented. The member
countries still possess a degree of competitive
spirit between one another. Again, the iron ex-
porters had long and hard negotiations over their
objectives, and strong differences of opinion were
apparent, with what could be described as a more
militant faction being aligned against a more
conservative faction.
going to press, namely, 1972-3-4; data from Mettalgeseilschaft AG: 'Metal Statistics,
1974'.
Column J : 'Consumers' equals Western Europe, USA, Canada and Japan; the 'producers' of
Column 2 equals all countries outside this region.
Colunm 2: refers to known reserves in 1970 (the metals) or 1972 (petroleum).
Thanks are due to Carlos Vignola for assistance in writing this, though the author takes responsibility for the views expressed.
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commodity
1
% consumptn.
from trade
2
producers'
share of
world reserves
main producing (rather than trading) countries
Petroleum 90% 70% USA, USSR, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela,
Kuwait (total: 66%)
Bauxite 74 62 Jamaica, USSR, Surinam, Guyana, Guinea, USA,
Hungary (total: 71 %)
Copper 46 47 USA, USSR, Zambia, Zaire, Canada, Chile,
(total: 72%)
Tin 97 79 Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, China
(total: 74%)
Notet and sources
Petroleum: Column 1 is the average of 1971-2 (the 'pre-OPEC' years); data from 'BP Statistical
Review of the World Oil Industry 1972'.
Metals: Column 1 is the average for the last three years for which data is available at time of
Table 1 takes some of Maull's points, and com-
pares the situation in the metals business with
that of petroleum. The 'importer dependence'
column shows how much of the metal consumed
in the western industrialised countries originates
outside them. The highest dependence is for tin;
only 3 per cent is mined within these consumer
nations. (This is the average for 1972/3/4.) In
contrast, only 46 per cent of the copper has to be
imported. The figure for petroleum in 1973 was
70 per cent.
Maull quotes the producers' share of reserves
as another factor. Table 1 gives this information
for 1970. The producers are, in general, sitting
upon a sizeable proportion of known reserves,
but it should be stressed that this is only relevant
in the long-term context. It can take five to ten
years to bring new mines on stream, and so that
is the minimal period meant here by 'long-term'.
Then, given this time horizon, the balance of
'known reserves' can change, as more exploration
is undertaken within the consuming areas. The
critical question is not how great a proportion
of reserves lie in the producing countries, but
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Copper
Bauxite
Tin
Iron ore
Silver and
table 2: Metal Producer Organisations
CIPECConseil Intergouvernemen-
tal des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre
IBAintergovernmental Bauxite
Association
ITCInternational Tin Council
OIECOrganisation of Iron Export-
ing Countries
mercury producers are also in various stages of
Table 2 gives some information about the pro-
ducers' organisations in the metals business. The
memberships may expand in the near future
which in itself may pose problems. On one hand,
an effective cartel needs to include all major pro-
ducers or exporters but, on the other hand, too
many members can cause problems in mainta3n-
ing unity.
It is hard to assess Maull's conclusion that OPECs
are unlikely to succeed in other minerals. Their
problems are great, ranging from political unity,
through substitution, to the feeling that OPEC
(or its imitators) may be making short-term
gains with long-term losses (somewhat different
from Maull's passing comment). This point can
be illustrated by conclusions of a study under-
whether the industrialised countries have reserves
sufficient for their needs.
More needs to be said about substitution. This
generally implies the replacement of one metal
by another but, in this context, it can mean
replacing one type of ore by another. Western
aluminium producers have traditionally relied on
bauxite; however, much research has been under-
taken in recent years on means of extracting
aluminium from other ores. Pilot plants are being
built.
Under these circumstances, the fact that the
bauxite producers have 62 per cent of known
reserves loses some of its significance; in a period
of time comparable to that necessary to develop
a significant proportion of these reserves, depen-
dence upon bauxite can have been reduced. This
has a further implication: the idea of a joint
copper-bauxite association hinges on the relative
degree of substitutability of one for the other,
so that putting them together would make for
more of a closed system. Bauxite's weakness
weakens the whole chain.
1967 Chile, Peru, Zambia, Zaire
1974 Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica,
Sierra Leone, Surinam, Yugoslavia
1932 Producers: Congo, Nigeria, Bolivia,
(initially) Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand
(+ 18 consumers)
1975 Algeria, Australia, Mauretania, Peru,
Chile, India, Venezuela, Sierra
Leone, Sweden, Tunisia (all
signed up or negotiating)
establishing organisations.
taken at the University of Chile: a CIPEC
'OPEC' could only work under 'normal' market
conditions (i.e. not a boom or recession), and then
only for a few years.'
The conclusion that some form of joint consumer-
producer agreements offer the best future needs
qualifying in two respects. Firstly, more sound
information is still needed. Secondly, OPEC's
price increase was a dramatic event by any
standards; the scope for less dramatic action (less
dramatic because of goals rather than purely
because of scope) should not be discounted.
1 Patricio Barros and Carlos Vignolo: "Poder Oligopolico en
el Mercado Mundial del Cobre", in Revista Ingeniera de
Sistemas, 1(1), June, 1975.
